3+the+United+Nations+Heads+North

Following the United Nation's massive victory with Operation Chromite, a feeling of invincibility seemed to surge throughout the allied forces, as the Republic of Korea began to get back on its feet following the recapture of Seoul. However, despite the fact that South Korea had been liberated, international leaders seemed to be only content with ridding all of Korea of the communist threat. Thus, allied troops moved against the Truman doctrine which sought to contain communism, by planning the invasion of all of North Korea. The results would be disastrous for the United Nations, and would eventually turn what was a victory into a stalemate.
 * Inchon's Aftermath**



As one historian and Korean Veteran noted, "MacArthur's original plan for exploiting the Inchon victory with a two-pronged drive across the 38th parallel was sound and simple enough. But its effectiveness depended upon three unknown factors the weather, the terrain, and the reaction of the Chinese. And, as it turned out, there were other developments that prompted the commander in Chief to alter his basic plan beyond all recognition, until he had units of the X Corps scattered all over the rugged Korean landscape, unable to support or even communicate directly with each other, and highly vulnerable to harassment by guerrilla forces or encirclement by an enemy that far outnumbered them" (Ridgway 43). As Matthew Ridgway observed, despite the fact that the United Nations held the upper hand they continued to place themselves in a dangerous position with every step they took towards the North. The unknown factors of the weather and Chinese would ultimately turn from strategic difficulties into tactical nightmares. As the Chinese had turned to communism under Mao Zedong, the relatively arrogant philosophy of the American government felt that the Chinese wouldn't support their North Korean ally on the grounds that it would be far too financially and socially unsettling for the Chinese government. Unfortunately, both General MacArthur and President Truman were devastatingly wrong.
 * Trouble on the Horizon**

Ridgway continued, "As for the intervention of the Chinese, MacArthur simply closed his ears to their threats and apparently ignored or belittled the first strong evidence that they had crossed the Yalu in force. The weather, he planned to outrace, he would close on the Yalu and bring hostilities to an end before the deep snows came. But the terrain, which he had not seen, proved to be an enemy whose strength he had never properly assessed. It made impossible even a tenuous liaison between forces on West and East" (Ridgway 43). Therefore, it may be deduced that MacArthur was leading an ill prepared assault on a territory dangerously close to a hostile border and without sufficient supplies to navigate the terrain or survive the winter.